Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortions and Female Mental Health by Klick, Jonathan
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2006 
Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortions and Female Mental 
Health 
Jonathan Klick 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Econometrics Commons, Family Law Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society 
Commons, Gender and Sexuality Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Health Policy Commons, 
Law and Gender Commons, Law and Society Commons, Mental and Social Health Commons, Sexuality 
and the Law Commons, and the Women's Studies Commons 
Repository Citation 
Klick, Jonathan, "Mandatory Waiting Periods for Abortions and Female Mental Health" (2006). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1124. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1124 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
 1/13/2006 10:20:25 AM 
183
MANDATORY WAITING PERIODS FOR 
ABORTIONS AND FEMALE MENTAL 
HEALTH 
Jonathan Klick†
INTRODUCTION
Econometric studies of the effects of changes in abortion policy 
on a host of social phenomena have proliferated in recent years.1 Re-
searchers have studied the effects of abortion access in many areas 
including crime,2 risky sexual behavior,3 child abuse,4 welfare expen-
† Jonathan Klick is the Jeffrey A. Stoops Professor of Law at Florida State 
University. He can be contacted at jklick@law.fsu.edu. 
1 For a non-technical review of this literature, see Jonathan Klick, 
Econometric Analyses of U.S. Abortion Policy: A Critical Review, 31 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 751 (2004) (using econometric research to analyze the effect of the United 
States’ abortion policy on sexual behavior, crime, opportunities for women, and 
public finance). 
2 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized 
Abortion on Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 379 (2001) (arguing that legalized abortion has 
contributed to a drop in crime rates); Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower 
Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1 (2004) (finding little evidence that legalized abor-
tion had an effect on crime rates); and John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Fur-
ther Evidence That Legalized Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce, 39 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 29 (2004) (linking legalized abortion and reduced crime rates). 
3 See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, The Effect of Abortion 
Legalization on Sexual Behavior: Evidence from Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 32 J.
LEGAL STUD. 407 (2003) (testing the hypothesis that legalized abortion has led to an 
increase in sexually transmitted diseases); and Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 
Abortion Access and Risky Sex Among Teens: Parental Involvement Laws and Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases (Oct. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=819304 (finding that teen gonor-
rhea rates dropped for Hispanic and white teens after implementation of parental 
involvement laws concerning abortion; effects on black teens were not statistically 
significant).
4 See, e.g., Marianne Bitler and Madeline Zavodny, Child Abuse and Abor-
tion Availability, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 363 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between 
child abuse rates and the legalization of abortion); and Susan B. Sorenson et al., Le-
galized Abortion and the Homicide of Young Children: An Empirical Investigation, 2 
ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES PUB. POL’Y 239 (2002) (finding that the legalization of abor-
tion led to a reduction in the number of one- to four-year old homicide victims).  
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ditures,5 and demographic changes.6 Others have looked at the effect 
of changes in abortion access on the welfare of women as a group, 
focusing on the economic opportunities that abortion indirectly pro-
vides to the extent it allows women to take control over their repro-
ductive functions.7
Relying on some of these studies, as well as more normative ar-
guments, abortion rights groups argue that abortion on demand has 
significantly improved the lives of women and society more gener-
ally.8 In fighting against state restrictions on abortion access, these 
groups suggest women’s interests will be harmed if any limitations are 
placed on the right to have an abortion.9
Although anti-abortion groups generally focus on harm done to 
the unborn baby to justify the abortion restrictions they seek at both 
the state and federal levels,10 in the case of mandatory waiting periods 
they appear to depart from their general strategy. The primary argu-
ment offered in support of these waiting periods is that they help 
women make more reasoned decisions about the resolution of their 
unplanned pregnancies.11 That is, given the emotionally charged na-
ture of the decision, supporters of waiting periods suggest a cooling 
5 See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber et al., Abortion Legalization and Child Living 
Circumstances: Who Is the “Marginal Child”?, 114 Q. J. ECON. 253 (1999) (examin-
ing and comparing the potential living circumstances of the marginal child not born 
because of abortion to the living circumstances of the average child born). 
6 See generally PHILLIP B. LEVINE, SEX AND CONSEQUENCES: ABORTION,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE ECONOMICS OF FERTILITY (2004) (analyzing the effect of 
abortion policy on birth rates domestically and internationally).   
7 See, e.g., Joshua D. Angrist & William N. Evans, Schooling and Labor 
Market Consequences of the 1970 State Abortion Reforms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 5406, 1996). However, for some potential problems 
created by abortion availability, see George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. ECON. 277 (1996) (advancing 
theoretical reasons why technical advances in abortion and female contraception have 
led to a rise in out-of-wedlock births).  
8 See, e.g., SUSANNE PICHLER, PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF 
AMERICA, INC., MEDICAL AND SOCIAL HEALTH BENEFITS SINCE ABORTION WAS MADE 
LEGAL IN THE U.S. (2002), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/pp2/portal/files/portal/ 
medicalinfo/abortion/fact-abortion-medical-social-benefits.xml.  
9 See, e.g., NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA, LEADING MEDICAL GROUPS
OPPOSE OBSTACLES TO ABORTION (2002), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/facts/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=1715. 
10 See, e.g., AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, FETAL PAIN: AN AGONIZING REALITY,
http://www.all.org/issues/ab12.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
11 See, e.g., Pro-Life News, Waiting Period Does Not Hinder the Murder of 
Children, COVENANT NEWS, June 24, 2005, http://www.covenantnews.com/abortion/ 
archives/013201.html. 
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off period so that pregnant women do not make rash decisions they 
will later regret.12
Opponents of waiting periods believe they do little to improve the 
welfare of women. At best, according to many pro-choice advocates, 
waiting periods have no effect on women’s decisions. At worst, the 
delay magnifies a woman’s mental anguish in dealing with the un-
wanted pregnancy, as well as extending the period of physical stress. 
Often, they claim that waiting periods are simply a device used to 
increase the cost and effort involved in securing an abortion. 
Although most individuals decide their positions regarding abor-
tion on the basis of normative precepts, the debate about this particu-
lar abortion restriction is premised on empirical assertions. That is, 
both sides appear to base their positions on beliefs about how waiting 
periods affect the mental health of women. Anti-abortion groups claim 
that women tend to make rash decisions about abortion, leading to 
regret and emotional distress later in life. In their view, waiting peri-
ods will lead to better decision making processes and, presumably, 
less regret. Pro-choice groups, on the other hand, believe waiting pe-
riods are at least an annoyance and might cause significant emotional 
or psychological harm as women are kept from exercising their rights. 
In this paper, I attempt to shed light on these empirical claims by 
analyzing the effect of waiting periods on adult female suicide rates. 
My results suggest that waiting periods do improve mental health 
among females as evidenced by a statistically and practically signifi-
cant drop in the suicide rate when states adopt waiting periods. The 
result does not appear to be an artifact of unobserved heterogeneity or 
simultaneity as it is robust to a variety of powerful specifications, in-
cluding instrumental variables analysis. 
In the section that follows, I motivate the use of suicide as my 
metric of mental health. I then describe the data I use in my analysis 
and discuss the statistical models I implement. After that, I present the 
results from various specifications to demonstrate that the effect is 
robust and appears to be causal. I follow the results with a discussion 
of alternate mechanisms that could be generating these results, and I 
highlight some extensions of the analysis that are in preparation. 
12 See, e.g., National Right to Life Committee, Is Abortion Safe?: Psycho-
logical Consequences, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/ASMF/asmf14.html (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2005) (describing the psychological effects some women experience after 
going through an abortion). 
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I. SUICIDE AS A PROXY FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
Both sides in the debate about how waiting periods affect the wel-
fare of women make empirical claims about the relationship between 
abortion and mental health. Supporters of mandatory delays suggest 
that women who make rash, irreversible decisions about their preg-
nancies often regret those decisions. This regret, according to their 
claims, leads to depression. Thus, waiting periods should improve the 
mental health of women with unwanted pregnancies by giving them a 
chance to reflect on their decisions.13 Opponents of the laws imply 
that delays in securing an abortion at least generate annoyances for 
women who do not want to continue their pregnancies. In some cases, 
they argue, the delays will actually be harmful to a woman’s mental 
health as she is forced to second-guess her decision potentially leading 
to depression. In this view, the adoption of waiting periods should 
lead to either no substantial effect or a negative effect on the mental 
health of those seeking an abortion. 
Research suggests that suicide is strongly correlated with 
depression.14 Some people who study suicide estimate that more than 
two-thirds of people who commit suicide suffer from depressive 
illness.15 For the present purpose, suicide should be a strong indicator 
of poor mental health. One could argue, however, that suicide reflects 
only very severe mental health problems. If the anguish created or 
mitigated by abortion delay laws is of a relatively small magnitude, 
suicide will be largely unaffected by the adoption of the laws. This 
concern biases any analysis using suicide as the dependent variable 
toward finding no effect of delays on mental health. On the other 
hand, if a statistically significant effect of delay laws on suicide is 
found, positive or negative, it is reasonable to assume that the effect 
underestimates the magnitude of the true causal relationship between 
delay laws and mental health.  
Further, it is interesting to note, anti-abortion advocates have 
claimed there is a causal link between abortion and suicide arising out 
of this regret-based depression.16 Relying on some academic work on 
13 Note that in many states, the waiting period follows the distribution of 
counseling materials that include information about alternatives to abortion. 
14 See Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, Are Mental Health Insurance 
Mandates Effective?: Evidence from Suicides, 15 HEALTH ECON. 83, 87 (2006). 
15 See John T. Maltsberger, The Psychodynamic Formulation: An Aid in 
Assessing Suicide Risk, in ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION OF SUICIDE 25, 31 (Ronald 
W. Maris et al. eds., 1992) (“About 70 [percent] [of persons who commit suicide] 
have significant depressive illnesses or alcoholism, or both.”). 
16 See, e.g., National Right to Life Committee, supra note 12. 
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the subject, they point out that suicide rates tend to be higher among 
women who abort their pregnancy rather than miscarry or carry the 
baby to term.17 However, such a finding could very well be the result 
of a self-selection bias. That is, it could be the case that women who 
choose to abort their pregnancies tend to be those who are predisposed 
to depression, implying that the link between abortion and suicide is 
coincidental as opposed to causal. 
From a data perspective, suicide represents a well measured, con-
sistent, and objective metric of mental health. The suicide data that are 
used in this analysis cover all known suicides in the country during 
the period 1981–1998. Further, at least as regards precise measure-
ment and comprehensiveness, suicide data is far superior to the next 
best option, which would involve survey data regarding individuals’ 
subjective evaluations of their own mental states. 
II. DATA 
For this paper, I examine state level female suicide rates as my 
dependent variable. I focus on suicides among women between the 
ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. I do not include very old women 
since they are past their reproductive window and their mental health 
should not be affected by abortion policy. I also exclude minors and 
very young adults since, during this same period, a number of states 
passed laws limiting minors’ access to abortion.18 While these laws 
should be unimportant for the mental health of adult women, they 
could represent an important confounding effect on the mental health 
of teens.19
The female suicide rate is defined as the number of completed 
suicides among women age twenty-five to sixty-four in the state per 
100,000 women in that age range in the state. My analysis covers the 
period 1981–1998. Data on completed suicides come from the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics’ Compressed Mortality File,20
which contains information on all completed suicides over time. 
These data are collected from death certificates filed in each state and 
17 Mika Gissler et al., Suicides After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94: Regis-
ter Linkage Study, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1431 (1996). 
18 These laws took the form of parental involvement laws which require a 
minor to get consent from or at least inform her parents that she is planning to get an 
abortion. 
19 The author is in the process of analyzing teen suicide rates as they relate to 
abortion restrictions in a separate paper. 
20 Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Preven-
tion, Compressed Mortality File: Underlying Cause of Death, http://wonder.cdc.gov/ 
mortSQL.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).  
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include the state of residence, age, race, and gender of each individ-
ual.21 In some specifications, I also control for the male suicide rate, 
which is acquired from the same source and covers the same age 
range.
Data on state adoption of mandatory waiting periods come from 
Bitler and Zavodny.22 For a year in which the state had a mandatory 
waiting period in place for the entire year, the variable takes the value 
of 1. The rest of the observations equal the percent of the year in 
which a mandatory delay law was in place. I also include a variable, 
constructed in a similar fashion and from the same source, measuring 
what fraction of the year the state had restrictions on Medicaid fund-
ing for abortions in place. Details regarding these laws are available in 
the Bitler and Zavodny article.23
In some specifications, I control for a host of other covariates. 
These include the labor force participation rate of women in the state, 
the unemployment rate in the state, real state income per capita, the 
percent of the state’s population that lives in rural areas, the percent 
with a college education, and the respective percentages of the state 
population indicating they belong to the following religious groups: 
Mormon, Southern Baptists, Catholics, and Protestants. Descriptive 
statistics, as well as data sources, are available in Table 1. 
Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Source
Female  
Suicide Rate 
Number of sui-
cides among 
women ages 
25-64 per 
100,000 women 
in the popula-
tion in that age 
range
7.085 2.288 National Cen-
ter for Health 
Statistics, 
Centers for 
Disease Con-
trol24
21 Id.
22 Marianne Bitler & Madeline Zavodny, The Effect of Abortion Restrictions 
on the Timing of Abortions, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 1011 (2001). 
23 Id. at 1013-14. For current state laws on mandatory waiting periods, see 
ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: MANDATORY COUNSELING AND 
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION 2 (2005), http://www.agi-usa.org/statecenter/spibs/ 
spib_MWPA.pdf. For the current state of Medicaid funding restrictions, see ALAN 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER 
MEDICAID 2 (2005), http://www.agi-usa.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf . 
24 Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 20.  
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Source
Male
Suicide Rate 
Number of 
suicides among 
men ages 25-
64 per 100,000 
men in the 
population in 
that age range 
26.173 12.361 National  
Center for 
Health  
Statistics, 
Centers for 
Disease  
Control25
Delay Percent of year 
state had man-
datory waiting 
period before 
an abortion can 
be obtained in 
effect 
0.055 0.224 Bitler and 
Zavodny26
Medicaid
Restriction 
Percent of year 
state restricted 
Medicaid fund-
ing for abor-
tions
0.704 0.452 Bitler and 
Zavodny27
Female  
Labor
Participation 
Labor force 
participation
rate of women 
57.899 5.174 Bureau of 
Labor
Statistics 
Unemploy-
ment 
Unemployment 
rate 
6.279 2.175 Bureau of 
Labor
Statistics 
Real Income Per capita in-
come adjusted 
for inflation in 
$100s
138.043 23.103 Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis 
Rural Percent of state 
population 
living in rural 
areas 
31.367 14.544 Bureau of the 
Census 
25 Id.
26 Bitler & Zavodny, supra note 22.  
27 Id.
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Source
College Percent of state 
population 
ages 25 and 
older that has 
graduated from 
college 
19.883 4.407 Bureau of the 
Census 
Mormon Percent of state 
population 
identified as 
belonging to 
Mormon relig-
ion
3.054 10.223 Glenmary 
Research Cen-
ter28
Baptist Percent of state 
population 
identified as 
belonging to 
Southern Bap-
tist congrega-
tion
7.346 10.117 Glenmary 
Research  
Center29
Catholic Percent of state 
population 
identified as 
being Roman 
Catholic
19.000 13.058 Glenmary 
Research  
Center30
Protestant Percent of state 
population 
belonging to a 
mainline Prot-
estant church 
21.911 9.818 Glenmary 
Research  
Center31
28 GLENMARY RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS &
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000: AN ENUMERATION BY REGION, STATE AND 
COUNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED FOR 149 RELIGIOUS BODIES (Dale E. Jones et al. 
eds., 2002). 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Source
Psychiatrists Number of 
psychiatrists 
practicing in 
state per 
100,000 popu-
lation
21.301 8.780 American 
Medical
Association 
Mental
Health 
Spending
State and  
federal per 
capita  
spending on 
mental health 
services  
41.750 21.138 National 
Association of 
State Mental 
Health  
Program
Directors 
Republican  
Governor
= 1 if state had 
Republican 
governor
0.481 0.500 Statistical 
Abstract of 
United States 
Republican 
Lower House 
Percent of 
seats in state 
legislature’s 
lower house 
held by  
Republicans 
0.432 0.175 Statistical 
Abstract of 
United States 
Republican  
Upper House 
Percent of 
seats in state 
legislature’s 
upper house 
held by  
Republicans 
0.430 0.180 Statistical 
Abstract of 
United States 
III. SPECIFICATIONS 
For my dependent variable, I take the natural log of the suicide 
rate data described above. Although my results are qualitatively simi-
lar if I focus on the non-transformed suicide rate, taking the natural 
log aids in exposition of the results.32 The general setup of my statisti-
cal models is to include dummy variable controls for each state to 
32 Particularly, it allows one to interpret coefficients on dichotomous vari-
ables as percentage changes and coefficients on other logged variables as elasticities. 
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capture idiosyncratic differences in suicide rates among the states that 
do not change over time. I also include dummy variables for each year 
within the analysis to control for any national temporal effects occur-
ring in the time period studied. The general model then takes the fol-
lowing form: 
( )ln st st st s tsuicide delayα χ λ τ= ⋅ + Θ + +
in which s denotes the state and t denotes the year of the observation. 
The “delay” variable represents the fraction of year t in which state s
had a delay law in effect. The next term represents the vector of state-
level covariates for year t. The next term represents constant state 
specific effects, and the last term indicates individual year effects that 
do not vary from state to state. 
To mitigate concerns that unobservable variables that affect sui-
cide rates could be changing at the same time delay laws are adopted 
(e.g., changes in how fastidiously authorities investigate suspicious 
deaths that could be suicides), in some specifications, I include the 
contemporaneous measure of male suicide rates which should control 
for any effects that are common to all suicides. 
In some instances, I also include a more complicated time effect, 
allowing each state to have its own independent trend in the data. For 
example, a particular state may be on a downward trajectory regarding 
suicide rates independent of anything that happens to change with 
respect to abortion laws. 
I perform weighted least squares regression techniques on these 
data where I weight each observation by the female population of the 
state that is between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four. I perform 
this weighting since the dependent variable is a rate to allow observa-
tions from larger states to have proportionately greater effect on my 
estimates. I also use report standard errors that are clustered at the 
state level. This allows for correlation among observations from a 
given state (say due to the continued existence of a given culture, so-
cial institutions, etc.) while assuming independence between observa-
tions from two different states. 
Given recent concerns by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan,33 in 
some specifications, I also allow for autocorrelation among observa-
tions, as well as heteroskedasticity. These concerns arise from the 
33 See Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-
Differences Estimates?, 119 Q. J. ECON. 249, 273-74 (2004) (investigating “how 
several standard estimation methods help deal with the serial correlation problem in 
the [Differences-in-Differences] context”). 
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likelihood that there is some inertia in state policies (i.e., once states 
pass a law, it is likely to endure for a while) which limits the inde-
pendence of observations across time. To correct for this, I use 
Newey-West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation-Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors in some specifications. 
IV. RESULTS 
In the most basic regression, as described above, I regress the 
natural log of state suicide rates among women ages twenty-five to 
sixty-four for the years 1981–1998 on the delay variable, the Medi-
caid funding restriction variable, a set of state-specific effects, and 
year effects common to all states, as well as the following covariates: 
female labor force participation; state unemployment rate; real per 
capita income in the state; percent of the state’s population living in 
rural areas; the percent of the state population with some college edu-
cation; the percent of the state population that identifies itself as 
Mormon, Southern Baptist, Catholic, and Protestant; the number of 
psychiatrists per capita in the state; and state mental health spending 
per capita. I weight each observation by the population of women in 
the twenty-five to sixty-four age range and I cluster standard errors by 
state.
As indicated in Table 2, I find a large negative effect of the adop-
tion of mandatory waiting periods on female suicide rates, and the 
effect is statistically significant at the 6 percent level. Effectively, I 
find that the adoption of a waiting period by a state reduces its female 
suicide rate by almost 10 percent. Among the covariates, I find statis-
tically significant effects from unemployment suggesting that suicide 
rates and unemployment rates move in the same direction.  
Also, there appears to be a negative relationship between college 
attendance and suicide rates. The negative relationship between Prot-
estant market share and suicide is the only statistically significant ef-
fect I find among the religion variables. Lastly, the positive associa-
tion between the presence of psychiatrists and suicide would appear to 
be the result of reverse causality (i.e., places with lots of suicides tend 
to draw more psychiatrists, not vice versa). The regression appears to 
explain about 80 percent of the variation in state suicide rates among 
women as indicated by the R squared statistic. 
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Table 2: 
The Effect of Abortion Waiting  
Periods on Female Suicide Rates 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Delay -0.094 
(0.064)
 Medicaid  
Restriction 
0.061
(0.177)
 Female Labor 
Participation 
0.004
(0.381)
 Unemployment 0.018 
(0.007)
 Real Income -0.001 
(0.610)
 Rural -0.001 
(0.904)
 College -0.016 
(0.004)
 Mormon -0.001 
(0.990)
 Baptist 0.011 
(0.570)
 Catholic -0.011 
(0.910)
 Protestant -0.012 
(0.028)
 Psychiatrists 0.025 
(0.002)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.001
(0.514)
Observations 900
 R2 0.85  
In the regression results presented in Table 3, I include state spe-
cific-trends which will help to rule out the possibility that the adoption 
of waiting periods happens to coincide with pre-existing state trends. 
For example, if states that adopt abortion waiting periods also happen 
to be states in the midst of a downward trend in female suicides, then 
the estimated relationship between waiting periods and suicides would 
not be causal. 
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Including the state-specific trends does not change the coefficient 
on waiting period adoption very much. I find that the adoption of a 
waiting period reduces the suicide rate by almost 11 percent and the 
effect is statistically significant at the 1.4 percent level. For the other 
covariates that had generated statistically significant coefficients, only 
unemployment remains important in this regression. Interestingly, this 
regression also implies that the adoption of state Medicaid funding 
restrictions is associated with an increase in the female suicide rate.34
This regression explains about 84 percent of the variation in state sui-
cide rates. 
Table 3: 
Waiting Periods and Female  
Suicide Rates 
Including State Trends 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Delay -0.106 
(0.014)
 Medicaid 
Restriction 
0.091
(0.038)
 Female Labor  
Participation 
-0.003
(0.559)
 Unemployment 0.017 
(0.084)
 Real Income -0.002 
(0.508)
 Rural 0.001 
(0.940)
 College -0.006 
(0.303)
 Mormon -0.016 
(0.374)
 Baptist -0.055 
(0.148)
 Catholic 0.014 
(0.520)
34 Although not examined here, the author is pursuing this result in another 
article. This result turns out to be robust to a number of specifications. The causal 
mechanism presumably involves the stress that women endure when they no longer 
have access to subsidized abortions such as enduring pregnancy and possibly facing 
the prospect of being responsible for a child the women did not want. 
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Table 3: 
Waiting Periods and Female  
Suicide Rates 
Including State Trends 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Protestant 0.001 
(0.899)
 Psychiatrists 0.003 
(0.664)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.001
(0.704)
Observations 900
 R2 0.844  
Before drawing conclusions about causality in statistical relation-
ships, it is important to explore the possibility that unobserved 
changes are not correlated both with the dependent variable (female 
suicide rates) and the policy variable of interest (adoption of waiting 
periods). This omitted variable bias can lead to spurious correlations.35
In this context, omitted variables bias could arise because of changes 
in the way the suicide data are collected, changes in relevant state 
policies (e.g., changes in alcohol taxes), etc. To mitigate this concern, 
in the regression presented in Table 4, I present the state-trends re-
gression from Table 3, but now I include the male suicide rate to cap-
ture any unobserved changes that affect suicide at the time waiting 
periods are adopted.
Again, I find that waiting periods lead to a 10 percent decline in 
the female suicide rate, and this coefficient is statistically significant 
at the 2.2 percent level. Medicaid funding restrictions are once again 
associated with a statistically significant increase in suicides. Of inter-
est, lastly, there is a very strong correlation between female and male 
suicide rates. The coefficient implies an elasticity of 0.42, meaning 
that when the male suicide rate goes up by 1 percent, the female sui-
cide rate goes up by 0.42 percent. The regression explains more than 
85 percent of the variation in state suicide rates. 
35 See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 334 (4th ed. 2003). 
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Table 4: 
Waiting Periods and Female  
Suicide Rates Including State 
Trends and Male Rates 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Delay -0.104 
(0.022)
 Medicaid  
Restriction 
0.074
(0.052)
 ln(Male Suicide 
 Rate) 
0.417
(0.000)
 Female Labor 
Participation 
-0.004
(0.349)
 Unemployment 0.011 
(0.168)
 Real Income -0.002 
(0.522)
 Rural -0.000 
(0.973)
 College -0.005 
(0.365)
 Mormon -0.005 
(0.760)
 Baptist -0.036 
(0.297)
 Catholic 0.009 
(0.069)
 Protestant -0.006 
(0.339)
 Psychiatrists 0.006 
(0.378)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.001
(0.490)
Observations 900
 R2 0.852  
As explained above, econometricians have raised some concerns 
about using legal changes to identify models using longitudinal data. 
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The concern revolves around the inertia that generally exists such that 
once a law is passed, it generally does not get overturned randomly. 
Instead, it tends to stay in effect indefinitely. This has the potential to 
generate autocorrelation in the estimates of these models. To mitigate 
this concern, I re-estimated the model presented in Table 4 using 
Newey-West Heteroskedastic-Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors36 choosing the lag structure optimally.37
As shown in Table 5, the statistical significance of the coefficient 
generated by the waiting period variable and that generated by the 
Medicaid funding restriction variable remain unchanged. 
Table 5: 
Waiting Periods and Female  
Suicide Rates Including State 
Trends and Male Rates  
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Delay -0.104 
(0.012)
 Medicaid  
Restriction 
0.074
(0.034)
 ln(Male Suicide 
 Rate) 
0.417
(0.000)
 Female Labor 
Participation 
-0.004
(0.329)
 Unemployment 0.011 
(0.084)
 Real Income -0.002 
(0.390)
 Rural -0.000 
(0.970)
 College -0.005 
(0.332)
 Mormon -0.005 
(0.813)
 Baptist -0.036 
(0.181)
36 See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMETRICS 506 (2003) (discussing when HAC standard errors should be used). 
37 Id. at 505 (explaining how to strike a balance by choosing the number of 
autocorrelations depending on the sample size). 
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Table 5: 
Waiting Periods and Female  
Suicide Rates Including State 
Trends and Male Rates  
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Catholic 0.009 
(0.503)
 Protestant -0.006 
(0.314)
 Psychiatrists 0.006 
(0.372)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.001
(0.453)
Observations 900
The effect of the adoption of mandatory waiting periods before an 
abortion can be performed appears to be quite robust. That is, 
regardless of the model used to investigate this effect, it would appear 
that waiting periods reduce suicide among women in the twenty-five 
to sixty-four age range. Further, this effect is quite large, hovering 
around the 10 percent mark. Additionally, restrictions on Medicaid 
funding for abortions seem to have the opposite effect, yielding 
statistically significant increases in the female suicide rate of about 7 
percent.
To subject this relationship to one more robustness check, I also 
examined an instrumental variables (IV) procedure to rule out the 
possibility that the passage of waiting periods and female suicide are 
somehow jointly determined. That is, for regression techniques to 
yield an unbiased estimate of the effect of waiting periods on suicide, 
it must not be the case that waiting periods are adopted in response to 
suicide rates or that some unknown factor is causally related to both 
suicide rates and the adoption of waiting periods.38
To implement IV procedures in this context, one must identify a 
set of “instruments” that are predictive of the adoption of mandatory 
waiting periods that are otherwise unrelated to female suicide rates. 
The analyst then performs a two-step procedure in which the waiting 
38 See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION 
AND PANEL DATA 83-107 (2002) (discussing instrumental variable estimation). 
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period variable is regressed on all of the covariates and the set of in-
struments to yield estimates of the likelihood that the waiting period is 
in effect in a given state during a given year. These predicted vari-
ables are then used in the second stage of the regression as proxies for 
the delay variable. If the set of instruments is highly predictive of the 
delay variable, and diagnostic tests suggest that the instruments are 
not otherwise related to suicide rates, the coefficient estimated in the 
second stage represents an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of 
adopting waiting periods on female suicide rates. 
For my IV estimation, I use the following instruments. First, I in-
clude an indicator for whether or not the state’s governor is from the 
Republican Party. Presumably, Republicans are more likely to support 
restrictions on abortion access, so we should expect a positive rela-
tionship between this instrument and the adoption of mandatory delay 
laws. Second, I include the fraction of seats in the state’s lower legis-
lative body that are held by Republicans based on the same intuition. 
Third, I include the fraction of seats in the state’s upper legislative 
body that are held by Republicans for the same reason. 
I present the first stage results in Table 6. As predicted, all of my 
instruments have a statistically significant positive effect on the adop-
tion of waiting periods. Further, their joint significance of 10.58 is 
quite high, suggesting that they are powerful instruments in the first 
stage.39
Table 6: 
First Stage Regression Predicting 
the Adoption of Waiting Periods 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Republican  
Governor
0.052
(0.000)
 Republican 
 Lower House 
0.316
(0.005)
 Republican  
Upper House 
0.306
(0.006)
 Medicaid  
Restriction 
-0.016
(0.562)
39 The conventional cut-off for a first stage F statistic for the instruments is 
10. See John Bound et al., Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation When the 
Correlation Between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variable Is 
Weak, 90 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 443 (1995). 
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Table 6: 
First Stage Regression Predicting 
the Adoption of Waiting Periods 
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 ln(Male Suicide 
 Rate) 
0.000
(0.997)
 Female Labor  
Participation 
0.002
(0.607)
 Unemployment 0.016 
(0.005)
 Real Income 0.007 
(0.000)
 Rural -0.046 
(0.000)
 College 0.014 
(0.016)
 Mormon -0.115 
(0.000)
 Baptist 0.043 
(0.033)
 Catholic 0.036 
(0.000)
 Protestant -0.006 
(0.119)
 Psychiatrists 0.001 
(0.869)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.000
(0.952)
Observations 899
 F for  
Instruments 
10.58
(0.000)
 R2 for  
Instruments 
0.067
 R2  0.788  
The second stage results are presented in Table 7. Again, I find 
that the adoption of waiting periods has a statistically significant (p = 
4.8 percent) negative effect on female suicide rates. These results im-
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ply that my earlier regressions underestimated the true causal effect of 
delay laws. The IV results suggest that the passage of waiting period 
laws lowers female suicide rates by about 30 percent. Further, the test 
of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are ex-
ogenous to female suicide rates.40 This diagnostic statistic along with 
the high first stage F suggests that these results sufficiently account 
for any bias arising for simultaneous determination of the adoption of 
mandatory waiting periods and female suicide rates. 
Table 7: 
Second Stage Results from IV 
Analysis of Waiting Periods and 
Suicide  
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Delay -0.298 
(0.048)
 Medicaid  
Restriction 
0.066
(0.060)
 ln(Male Suicide 
Rate)
0.414
(0.000)
 Female Labor 
Participation 
-0.004
(0.340)
 Unemployment 0.016 
(0.025)
 Real Income -0.001 
(0.825)
 Rural -0.010 
(0.384)
 College -0.002 
(0.611)
 Mormon -0.029 
(0.388)
 Baptist -0.032 
(0.214)
 Catholic 0.015 
(0.196)
40 See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 38, at 122-24 (explaining testing of overi-
dentifying restrictions). 
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Table 7: 
Second Stage Results from IV 
Analysis of Waiting Periods and 
Suicide  
(p values in parentheses) 
Variable Coefficient 
 Protestant -0.006 
(0.244)
 Psychiatrists 0.006 
(0.377)
 Mental Health 
Spending
0.001
(0.539)
Observations 899
 R2 0.848  
 Hansen J  
Statistic 
0.215
(0.898)
V. POSSIBLE CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
Given the foregoing results, it appears as though there is a strong 
causal relationship between the adoption of mandatory waiting peri-
ods for abortions and female suicide rates. What mechanism drives 
this decrease in suicide rates? I have suggested, on the basis of the 
arguments made by supporters of waiting periods, that waiting periods 
induce added reflection on the part of a woman seeking an abortion. 
This added reflection presumably causes a woman to have less regret 
after having an abortion, decreasing the incidence of depression and 
ultimately of suicide. 
However, it could be the case that waiting periods generate this 
effect by reducing the number of abortions. If abortion itself leads to a 
heightened risk for suicide, then a decrease in the number of abortions 
would be expected to lower the suicide rate. It is not clear whether 
waiting periods do reduce the abortion rate,41 so this mechanism is 
41 See, e.g., Ted Joyce & Robert Kaestner, The Impact of Mandatory Waiting 
Periods and Parental Consent Laws on the Timing of Abortion and State of Occur-
rence Among Adolescents in Mississippi and South Carolina, 20 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 263 (2001) (finding that waiting periods might cause individuals to travel to 
other states to obtain an abortion but that generally waiting periods have no effect on 
the timing of abortions). Bitler and Zavodny find no systematic effect of waiting 
periods on abortion rates, though, in some specifications, they do find that the adop-
tion of waiting periods is associated with a shift in the timing of abortions with post 
first term abortions substituted for first term abortions. Bitler & Zavodny, supra note 
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questionable and deserves more study. Further, the results regarding 
the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions cut against this interpreta-
tion as well. I find indications of a positive association between Medi-
caid funding restrictions and the suicide rate that are fairly robust, and 
others have documented the negative relationship between funding 
restrictions and the abortion rate.42 Thus, if there was a strong positive 
association between abortion and suicide, we would expect to see a 
negative coefficient for the Medicaid funding restriction variable in 
the regressions above. 
I am exploring this topic much more carefully in another work in 
progress, focusing on a number of policies that have a documented 
negative effect on abortion access. If the results continue to suggest a 
positive relationship between suicide and policies that actually inhibit 
(as opposed to merely delay) access to abortion, the question arises as 
to what light this sheds on other work that appears to find a positive 
association between abortion and suicide. 
The most prominent of these studies was done by Mika Gissler 
and colleagues who examined data from the Finish Hospital Dis-
charge Registry.43 They found that there were 5.9 suicides per 100,000 
women giving birth during the period 1987-1994.44 This compares 
favorably to the rate of suicide among the general population of 
women which was 11.3 per 100,000 women in the population.45 For 
those women who miscarried their pregnancy, the suicide rate was 
18.1 per 100,000 women who miscarried.46 Lastly, they found that 
ending a pregnancy through an induced abortion was associated with a 
suicide rate of 34.7 per 100,000 women who received abortions.47
This increased risk of suicide was found throughout the various age 
groups.48
These results led the researchers to propose two competing hy-
potheses about the causal mechanism relating abortion to suicide. 
They posit that either abortion generates harmful effects for a 
woman’s mental health or there are common unobserved characteris-
22, at 1030. 
42 See, e.g., Phillip B. Levine et al., The Effect of Medicaid Abortion Funding 
Restrictions on Abortions, Pregnancies and Births, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 555, 555 
(1996).
43 Gissler et al., supra note 17, at 1431. 
44 Id. at 1432.  
45 Id. at 1431. 
46 Id. at 1432. 
47 Id.   
48 Id.   
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tics or risk factors that lead a woman to end her pregnancy in abortion 
and also lead her to commit suicide.49
While my results are still preliminary, they would seem to support 
the self-selection hypothesis more strongly than the adverse effects 
hypothesis. Medicaid funding restrictions represent an exogenous 
shock to abortion access that is largely unrelated to any of an 
individual’s unobserved risk factors, allowing us to approximate the 
kind of random assignment to abortion that would be necessary to rule 
out the self-selection problem. To the extent that the Medicaid 
funding restriction coefficients hold up in my continuing research, 
they would suggest that after one controls for the common risk factors 
that contribute to an individual’s propensity to have an abortion and to 
commit suicide, the causal effect of abortion and suicide is actually 
negative. That is, it would seem that, at least for the relatively poor, 
limiting the option for abortion increases the likelihood of suicide. 
This is consistent with the Gissler study which found an increased 
incidence of suicide among poor mothers who carried their babies to 
term. Presumably, people in this economic group on the margin are 
ill-equipped to deal with the burdens that come with caring for a baby, 
leading to increased stress and depression. 
To the extent that there is any positive association between abor-
tion and suicide, independent of the self-selection effect, my results on 
the effect of mandatory waiting periods suggest that regret over a 
hastily made decision to abort could be at the root of the association. 
Thus, interventions that inform and counsel a pregnant mother regard-
ing the resolution of her unplanned pregnancy could significantly im-
prove the welfare of women. The reduction in suicides represents only 
a lower bound of the benefits of these interventions, since presumably 
there are a number of women in this situation who have regret and 
suffer depression because of it without rising to the suicide threshold. 
Waiting periods and counseling would likely benefit these individuals 
too.
VI. EXTENSIONS 
As discussed above, I am currently developing an expanded 
analysis of the effect of abortion restrictions on female suicide rates. 
Of particular interest, in the context of the results presented here, is an 
analysis of whether waiting periods lead to significant changes in 
abortion rates. If, as many pro-abortion rights groups claim, waiting 
periods deter very few women from having abortions, this would sug-
49 Id. at 1431, 1433-34.  
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gest that the effect identified here is entirely due to women feeling 
more comfortable about their decisions to abort, leading to less regret 
and attendant depression. On the other hand, if the assertion about the 
relationship between waiting periods and abortion rates is not sup-
ported by the data, and the adoption of waiting periods does system-
atically reduce the abortion rate, it might suggest that abortion does 
lead to adverse effects for some women, leading to mental illness and 
eventual suicide.
Such a result would be hard to square with the coefficients esti-
mated here for the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions, assuming 
they hold up. Perhaps there is a heterogeneity of effects in which, for 
poor women, the burden of an unwanted child dominates the regret 
effect and greater abortion access is more favorable for mental health, 
while for more affluent women, the regret effect tends to dominate, 
implying that waiting periods and counseling will be welfare-
improving for individuals from this segment of society. 
In addition to examining the Medicaid funding restrictions more 
carefully and investigating the effect of waiting periods on abortion 
rates, I also plan to examine these issues for teenagers specifically. 
The Gissler study suggests that teens suffer pronounced increases in 
suicide incidence both when they have an abortion and when they 
carry a child to term (interestingly, they are the only age group that 
exhibits the latter effect). Further, we might think that teens are par-
ticularly susceptible to making rash decisions and thus could espe-
cially benefit from waiting periods. Also, with teens, I can exploit an 
additional public policy that affects abortion access, namely parental 
involvement laws, which have large effects on the abortion rates of 
teens.50
CONCLUSION 
Debates over abortion policy have not grown any more concilia-
tory in the three decades since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. 
Wade.51 In recent confirmation hearings, Judge John Roberts was 
questioned repeatedly about his views on a woman’s right to abor-
tion.52 Groups favoring abortion rights undertook large campaigns to 
50 See Bitler & Zavodny, supra note 22. 
51 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
52 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
27-28, 37, 47, 142, 145, 160, 186, 206, 224-25, 237-38, 255, 268, 284, 289, 290, 295, 
299, 325, 381, 393, 401, 476, 521, 525, 537-39, 541 (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.
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undercut the Roberts nomination because their members believe Rob-
erts harbors pro-life sympathies and a disdain for the jurisprudential 
foundations of Roe.53
In society at large, though Americans favor keeping abortion legal 
by a slight majority, large majorities of people support some or all of 
the various restrictions states have placed on abortion access, includ-
ing parental involvement laws, Medicaid funding restrictions, and pre-
abortion waiting periods and counseling. Although most individuals 
decide their positions on these various matters on the basis of norma-
tive principles, these various policies have the potential to generate 
significant welfare effects on a number of different dimensions. 
Empirical examination of these welfare effects is important to in-
form state abortion policy, particularly given the divisions that exist 
among voters on the basic normative principles. If there is no norma-
tive consensus, presumably consequentialist concerns can break the 
deadlock. Social scientists have weighed in on a host of the policy 
implications of abortion access, ranging from crime to sexually trans-
mitted diseases, fertility trends, and child abuse. We know much more 
about the social effects of abortion than we did ten years ago, and 
hopefully researchers will continue in this vein. 
This paper attempts to make progress on one dimension of the 
consequences of changes in abortion access. I examine the relation-
ship between the adoption of mandatory waiting periods before which 
an abortion can be secured and the mental health of women seeking 
abortions. I find that the adoption of mandatory waiting periods re-
duces female suicide rates anywhere between 10 and 30 percent. This 
effect is statistically significant and robust to a range of controls for 
simultaneity bias, including the use of state-specific trends and in-
strumental variables analysis. 
It would appear as though waiting periods (and the counseling 
that usually accompanies them) induce a more reasoned approach to 
the abortion decision, avoiding rash decisions on the part of the preg-
nant women. Better decision-making processes presumably lead to 
fewer regrets later on, lowering the incidence of depression and, ulti-
mately, suicide. These results suggest mandatory waiting periods rep-
resent public policies that generate large welfare gains for women 
faced with unwanted pregnancies. 
Although the relationship is not investigated as rigorously here, it 
also appears as though restricting Medicaid funding for abortions 
53 See, e.g., Mark Memmott, Special Interests Gear Up for Fight on Court 
Vacancy, USA Today, Sept. 6, 2005, at 16A; and Jill Zuckman & Frank James, Judge 
Meets His Jury on Capitol Hill, CHIC. TRIB., July 21, 2005, at 14. 
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leads to an increase in female suicide rates. It would seem that fund-
ing restrictions lower the access one has to abortion services, leading 
women to bear the burdens of childbirth and child rearing for which 
they may not be ready. This apparently leads to increases in stress 
levels and eventually a rising suicide rate. 
This latter result suggests previous research that identified a posi-
tive relationship between abortion and suicide might have suffered 
from self selection problems to the extent that similar characteristics 
lead a woman to both have an abortion and to commit suicide. If self-
selection does not completely explain this empirical finding, then it 
might be the case that the relationship differs by socio-economic 
class, with abortion access restrictions leading to improved mental 
health for wealthier women and worsened mental health for poor 
women. This demands further research. 
